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Abstrat
We build a simple model of quantity ompetition to analyze the
eet of swithing osts on equilibrium behavior of duopolists. We
haraterize the industry struture as a funtion of initial sales of two
rms. Contrary to the literature, initial asymmetries persist in our
model even though the rms are idential. When the disparity between
initial sales is large, the smaller rm may beome very aggressive and
get more than half of the market in equilibrium. When the rms have
similar initial positions, they tend to be loked in them.
JEL Classiation: L11, L13
Keywords : quantity ompetition, swithing osts
1 Introdution
Sine a series of pioneering work by Klemperer [5, 6, 4℄ and vonWeizsäker [9℄
it has been widely aepted by eonomists that osts inurred by onsumers
while hanging providers of goods and servies play an important role in
organization of industries. To list just a few aspets, swithing osts aet
ompetition intensity, attrativeness of entry, ollusion possibilities, and the
market struture. The osts themselves originate from dierent soures.
Klemperer [6℄ identied three types: learning osts, transation osts and
artiial ontratual osts.
Learning osts are the eort and time spent to reah an operating level
of knowledge of speial harateristis of a new produt that allows the on-
sumer to use this produt with the same ease as an old one. For example,
∗
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omputer operating systems may be (arguably) funtionally idential, but
require dierent spei knowledge. Transation osts arise, for example,
while hanging a bank aount: it takes both time and eort to lose one
aount and to open another. Contratual osts are aused by deliberate
ations of rms reating ost of swithing away from the urrent provider.
This type of osts is exemplied by frequent-yer programs. In total, it is
hard to nd a market in whih produts do not exhibit any of three types
of swithing osts. Farell and Klemperer [7℄ is a omprehensive survey that
deals mainly with the eets of swithing osts on ompetition and entry.
The eonomi literature identies two eets that swithing osts have on
entry. On one hand, they failitate entry, as the inumbent is less interested
in new ustomers. Without disrimination between the old and the new
ustomers the prie will have to be lower for the whole ustomer base, not
only for the new ustomers. On the other hand, swithing osts failitate
entry deterrene, as the inumbent an use limit priing more easily. In
partiular, in the period of entry the entrant must prie signiantly below
the inumbent to attrat new onsumers.
The former eet dominates in the model of Farell and Shapiro [3℄.
Their demand stems from overlapping generations of buyers (in eah period
a ohort of young buyers enters the market and lives for two periods). On
the supply side there are two sellers. In this model the rm with attahed
ustomers speializes in serving them and onedes new buyers to its rival.
The swithing osts lok in onsumers and onfer a signiant market power
that results in higher prots. However, these higher prots attrat new
entrants and may even lead to ineiently high entry. Klemperer [5℄ in a
two period model with a single onsumer generation shows, however, that the
inumbent may preempt entry by apturing a large market share or in other
irumstanes by keeping a small ustomers base to remain an aggressive
ompetitor.
We do not onsider entry expliitly, but we note that (i) swithing osts
make entry deterrene possible in our model; (ii) the sale of entry depends
on the magnitude of swithing osts.
Another problem disussed in the literature is the eet of swithing
osts on the ompetitiveness of markets. Klemperer [4℄ builds a two-period
dierentiated-produts duopoly with swithing osts and nds that the non-
ooperative equilibrium in an oligopoly with swithing osts leads to vigorous
ompetition for market share in the early stages of the market's development.
This results in the prie rise from the rst period to the subsequent periods,
beause the rms ompete for market share that is valuable later. However,
the pries in this model may be higher than in ompetition without swithing
osts.
Padilla [8℄ shows that swithing osts always relax ompetition ompared
to the situation with no swithing osts. However, he only onsiders very high
swithing osts with some onsumers uninformed and some being replaed
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by the new ones. As a result, all the equilibria are mixed priing strategy
equilibria with asymmetri market shares.
Similarly, in our model the rms have asymmetri market shares in equi-
librium. However, it is not the fat that the rms use mixed strategies in
equilibrium that generates this result. We assume that the rms start the
game with exogenously alloated ustomer bases that need not be the equi-
librium ones. Solving the game for all suh alloations we haraterize the
resulting equilibria. In our model the information is omplete and perfet
and pure strategy asymmetri equilibria exist also for a subset of initially
symmetri market shares.
In an attempt to haraterize industry dynamis Padilla [8℄ interprets the
mixed strategy random equilibrium realizations of very low pries as sales
or stohasti prie wars. In his model, when both rms set a low prie as
a realization of random equilibrium strategies, prie wars obtain; when only
one of the rms sets a low prie, unilateral sales our. We believe that the
resulting utuating prie series that this model generates do not reet well
the observed stability of industry pries. Moreover, his model annot explain
persistent asymmetri market shares that we observe in many industries.
Namely in Padilla [8℄ there is a persistent tendeny to symmetri market
shares and asymmetries will only result from randomization over strategies
in equilibrium. Our model, on the other hand, aptures both these features
of reality, relative stability of pries, and persistent asymmetries in market
shares.
The fous of our paper, however, is the short-term industry dynam-
is rather than long-term outome analyzed in the most of the literature.
Swithing osts allow for history dependene, whih plays a ruial role in
the short term. We haraterize period-to-period dynamis for any initial
level of outputs of two rms.
Despite the fous on short term dynamis we show that onvergene to
the lassial symmetri Cournot equilibrium does not happen even in an
innitely repeated game even if swithing osts are small.
We model the industry by a one-shot game where the rms simultane-
ously deide on the quantities they produe. Demand is given exogenously
by a linear funtion.
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We are looking for subgame perfet Nash equilibria.
For very small initial output levels, inluding zero output for both rms,
we obtain unique symmetri equilibrium, where the quantity produed in-
reases from the initial one and lower than the quantity produed in equi-
librium in the absene of swithing osts. This is similar to the result of
Klemperer [4℄, where the ompetition is most intensive in the initial period.
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We an think of this demand as being generated by a ontinuum of ustomers whose
valuations are uniformly distributed on an interval. Thus, the valuation of qth ustomer
is p(q). A ustomer inurs xed osts whenever he did not make a purhase from the same
rm in the previous period. Thus, the osts are inurred whenever the ustomer swithes
a rm or when he rst purhases the good. This is the same demand as [5℄.
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For higher initial quantities of either of the rms we obtain also asym-
metri equilibria. To the best of our knowledge, this result is not present in
the literature to date.
Quantity inreases are relatively less attrative with a higher ustomer
base. That is why the initial alloations in whih both rms have high out-
puts result in the set of equilibria where the quantities remains unhanged.
These are situations in whih the inentives for both rms to harvest existing
ustomer base are stronger than the inentives for expansion.
An interpretation of these results is in the hoie of entry mode when one
an opt for an early entry with a limited apaity or for a later entry with
a large apaity. The latter may be preferred in industries with swithing
osts even if after the entry apaity expansion is allowed. Namely, for large
enough swithing osts and aptured market, the inentives for expansion
are absent, and the rm might get loked in a less protable equilibrium.
Interesting asymmetri equilibria obtain when either one or both of the
rms have an initially alloated output in the medium range (we shall har-
aterize medium range more preisely later). Eah of the rms, given rival's
initial output wants to inrease the output - future prot inreases are at-
trative. However, if the rival inreases the quantity largely enough, lowering
the prie further, the rm no longer wants to inrease the output and prefers
to keep a high present prie and harvest existing ustomers. This results in
an asymmetri equilibrium where one of the rms ends up bigger, and the
other does not hange its output.
We onsider industry dynamis in teleommuniations of 6 European
ountries to illustrate our ndings. The data are supportive of our general
predition that more asymmetri rms tend to symmetry more.
The quantitative results of our analysis survive in a multi-period set-
ting. Thus, our model does not predit onvergene to symmetri output
alloations over time.
The rest of the paper is strutured as follows. In setion 2 we formulate
and solve the model, in setion 3 we disuss omparative statis, in setion 4
- entry. Setion 5 is devoted to short-term industrial dynamis, setion 6 - to
the extension of our model to multiple periods, setion 7 - to the impliations
of our results.
2 The Model
We onsider a one-shot Cournot game with two rms, demand p(q) and pro-
dution osts C(q). Swithing osts of hanging a provider are s. The sup-
pliers annot disriminate between dierent onsumers aording to whether
or not they have made the purhase in the previous period. Thus, whenever
the sellers want to expand the sales they have to oer a disount to all on-
sumers. The formulation of demand is idential to [5℄. We add initial sales
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to the model, whereby the rms start playing the game with some history,
whih proxies the ustomer base of the rm. The maximization problem of
a seller is thus
max pii =
(
p
(
q2i + q
2
j
)− sIi) q2i − C (q2i ) , (1)
where
Ii =
{
1, q2i > q
1
i ;
0, q2i ≤ q1i .
Ii aptures the disount when the seller wants to inrease sales from that
of previous period and q1i denotes the volume of initial sales. The initial sales
are treated as exogenous. To be able to obtain analytial results we look at
the linear demand p(q) = a− bq and linear osts C(q) = cq.
pii =
(
a− b (q2i + q2j )− sIi) q2i − cq2i , (2)
Denote for onveniene x = a−c
3b
and S = s
3b
. Next, x the strategy of
rm A to q2A. The best response of the rm B given its initial sales q
1
B is to
maximize
piB
(
q2B |q1B, q2A
)
=
{
b
(
3x− (q2B + q2A)) q2B q2B ≤ q1B ;
b
(
3x− (q2B + q2A)− 3S) q2B q2B > q1B . (3)
The problem is onave in q1B on eah interval, so we an nd optima
separately and then ompare them. Dierentiation gives
pi′B
(
q2B|q1B, q2A
)
=
{
b
(
3x− (2q2B + q2A)) , q2B ≤ q1B;
b
(
3x− (2q2B + q2A)− 3S) , q2B > q1B. (4)
From equation above we obtain andidate best responses and rewrite
them as
q2B =
{
1
2
(3x− qA) , q2B ≤ q1B;
1
2
(3x− 3S − qA) , q2B > q1B.
(5)
This ondition simply states that in the seond period the seller B, when
he is expanding the quantity will, given strategy of A, expand to
1
2
(3x −
3S − qA). When B is ontrating sales, given strategy of A, he will set the
quantity to
1
2
(3x − qA). After plugging the orresponding expressions for
the seond period quantities into the onditions and the realizing that in
the remaining interval B responds with no hange in quantity, q2B = q
1
B, we
obtain:
q2B =


1
2
(3x− qA) , 12 (3x− qA) ≤ qB;
q1B,
1
2
(3x− 3S − qA) ≤ qB < 12 (3x− qA) ;
1
2
(3x− 3S − qA) , 12 (3x− 3S − qA) > qB.
(6)
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We have dropped the supersript for onveniene, as now only initial
sales are present in the rhs.
The part of the best response funtion that is relevant for quantity in-
rease is omputed under the assumption that it is optimal for a rm to
inrease the quantity. However, it may not be so for output values lose
to the best response. The rm would in that ase prefer not to raise the
quantity, beause of the penalized prie whih it obtains in doing so. There-
fore, we ompute the set of initial alloations for whih the rm is indierent
between inreasing the quantity to best response and keeping it as it was
before, and then dene the global best response for the seond period as
q2B =


1
2
(3x− qA) , 12 (3x− qA) ≤ qB;
qB , yB ≤ qB < 12 (3x− qA) ;
1
2
(3x− 3S − qA) , qB < yB.
(7)
Here
yi =
1
2
(3x− qj −
√
3S
√−3S + 6x− 2qj),
is the urve whih haraterizes the initial qi for eah strategy qj for whih
the rm i is indierent between inreasing the quantity and not hanging
it from the one initially alloated. In Figure 1 these are plotted as dashed
onvex urves.
It proves useful to take on the following notation. First, dene
z =
3
25
(2S + 5x− 2
√
6S
√
−4S + 5x), (8)
as qi oordinate of the intersetion of the higher best response line for rm j
with the indierene set for rm i, yi. In the gure this is denoted by dashed
horizontal line. Moreover,
φ =
1
2
(S + 2x−
√
3
√
S
√−S + 4x) (9)
is the qi oordinate of the projetion of the intersetion of lower best re-
sponses (x− S, x− S) on yi. Finally,
ν =
1
3
(−7S + 3x + 2
√
S2 + 3Sx) (10)
is the qi oordinate of the intersetion of lower best response of rm j with
i's indierene set yi.
We proeed to nd the equilibria and haraterize them in the following
propositions. We shall assume, without loss of generality, that rm B never
has higher initial sales than rm A.
Proposition 1. The unique Nash equilibrium of the game speied
above is haraterized by the following strategy proles:
(i)
6
(x− S, x− S) if qA,B ≤ ν, (11)
(x, x) if qA,B ≥ x. (12)
(ii)
(qA,
3
2
(x− S)− 1
2
qA) if
((qB ≤ yB) ∩ (yA ≤ qA ≤ x + S)) ∪ ((φ ≤ qA ≤ yA) ∩ (qB ≤ ν)) , (13)
(x + S, x− 2S) if (qA ≥ x + S) ∩ ((qB ≤ z) ∪ (qB ≤ yB)), (14)
(
3
2
x− 1
2
qB, qB) if (qA ≥ 3
2
x− 1
2
qB) ∩ (x ≥ qB ≥ z); (15)
(iii)
(qA, qB) if (qB ≥ yB) ∩ (qA ≤ 3
2
x− 1
2
qB), (16)
Proof. We onstrut the equilibrium from intersetion of global best
responses, as outlined by (7). 
Equations (11) and (12) haraterize the two symmetri equilibria de-
noted, respetively, by letters A and C in Figure 1. The rst equilibrium
results from low, inluding 0, initial sales for both sellers. In Figure 1 this
initial alloation orresponds to the white area under the diagonal lose to
the origin. Both rms inrease the quantity but total sales in the resulting
equilibrium are low. Any other equilibrium in our model is haraterized by
higher total sales. The seond symmetri equilibrium (denoted by C in the
gure) results from both rms selling large volume in the previous period.
This area of initial sales volumes is above the horizontal dashed line through
C. In this equilibrium both rms derease the quantity to the level of the
equilibrium without swithing osts. This is also the equilibrium where total
quantity sold is the highest.
Equations (13)- (15) haraterize equilibria in whih the initially smaller
rm (weakly) inreases the quantity and the bigger one (weakly) dereases
it. This type of equilibria results when the asymmetry in initial sales is
large and the the larger rm A's sales exeed the threshold dened by yA.
Equation (13) thus haraterizes the unique asymmetri equilibrium whih
in Figure 1 orresponds to the area (13) below the urve yb to the left of
x + S.
Equation (14) in turn haraterizes the equilibrium resulting from the
bigger of the rms inheriting large sales (in Figure 1 this means that A
has sales beyond q˜A), whereas the smaller rm had muh smaller sales(B
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had initial sales below the dashed indierene urve or below the dashed
horizontal line denoted by z). In equilibrium, the bigger rm will derease
its sales volume whereas the smaller one will inrease it moderately. The
equilibrium in the Figure is now at the intersetion of best response lines,
denoted by B.
Equation (15) gives equilibrium sales volumes for initial alloations whih
in Figure 1 fall into the region to the right of the higher of the best response
lines for rm A and between the horizontal lines through C and z. In this
ase the large rm, A, will derease the quantity the other rm will not
hange sales.
Equation (16) haraterizes equilibrium resulting from levels of initial
sales in the medium range. In this ase none of the rms has an inentive
neither to inrease nor to derease its sales from the initial ones. In the gure
this set is represented by the grey entral area. Clearly for relatively high
levels of initial sales the opportunity osts of expansion are high for both
rms and none of them has an inentive to inrease sales.
As we have shown, at very low, inluding zero quantities in the rst
period there is only a symmetri equilibrium where both rms inrease sales
(the white area below the 45 degrees line lose to the origin in the gure).
However, for a set of initial alloations where both rms still have rela-
tively low, but at least one of the rms has initial sales larger than ν, multiple
equilibria may obtain. This leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The multiple Nash equilibria of the game speied above
are haraterized by the following strategy proles:
(qA,
3
2
(x− S)− 1
2
qA) together with
(x− S, x− S) if (φ ≥ qA ≥ ν) ∩ (qB ≤ ν), (17)
(qA,
3
2
(x− S)− 1
2
qA) together with
(x− S, x− S) and
(
3
2
(x− S)− 1
2
qB, qB) if (φ ≥ qA ≥ ν) ∩ (φ ≥ qB ≥ ν), (18)
(qA,
3
2
(x− S)− 1
2
qA) together with
(
3
2
(x− S)− 1
2
qB , qB) if (yA ≥ qA ≥ φ) ∩ (ν ≤ qB). (19)
Proof. Analogous to Proposition 1. 
Multiple equilibria arise beause of the interation between the strategies
played by the other player and inentives to inrease the sales. A relatively
large inrease in sales by one of the players may ause the other player to be
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better o not hanging its sales from the initial ones. For the set of initial
sales whih give multiple equilibria both rms are potentially interested in
inreasing sales, and at least one does so. If both rms indeed inrease
sales, this leads to a symmetri equilibrium. The larger, in our ase rm
A, however, has an inentive to inrease sales only as long as B does not
hoose a large inrease in sales. As A's ustomers base is no longer very
small it beomes optimal not to inrease the quantity for large inreases
in B's quantity. In turn, large inrease, as a response to a strategy of no
hange of A for this strategy of B, beomes attrative for B. These strategi
interations imply an additional asymmetri equilibrium in onjuntion with
the symmetri one.
The rst set of multiple equilibria whih result from rm B being initially
signiantly smaller than A is haraterized by (17), whih an also be seen
from the Figure 1. It is obvious that either the rm B will be bigger in
equilibrium or both rms will have equal sales volumes at x− S.
If we move initial sales of B to the levels lose to those of A we have
3 possible equilibria - where either A or B has a higher output and a sym-
metri equilibrium with both rms having equal outputs. In Figure 1 this
set of initial sales volumes is denoted by (18). The resulting equilibria are
haraterized by the orresponding equation.
There is also a possibility of two asymmetri equilibria when sales vol-
umes of the rms in the initial period are lose. In the gure this set is the
region (19). The resulting equilibria are haraterized by the orresponding
equation.
In line with the literature on the swithing osts, the rm with a smaller
initial market share is relatively more aggressive. The reason is that the
larger rm has greater inentives to exploit its ustomer base and thus laks
inentives for ostly expansion. In the present model, however, we an trae
the adverse eet of aggressive strategies on the expansive intentions of the
other player and obtain asymmetri equilibria, even when the rms are om-
pletely symmetri along all dimensions.
As the propositions make lear, equilibrium quantities depend on the
initial alloation of output between rms in the presene of swithing osts.
The outomes are sometimes sensitive to small hanges in the initial ondi-
tions. This sensitivity is reeted in the abrupt hanges of the equilibrium
quantities for small hanges in initial sales volumes of one or both rms.
Together with possible multiple equilibria, this implies that an attempt at
predition of the industry struture outomes in reality with swithing osts
may not be a very fruitful operation. This has been a reurrent, but never
satisfatorily explained argument in the literature on swithing osts.
We have shown that for a one period model asymmetri equilibria will
result for a subset of asymmetri (and a subset of symmetri) initial sales
alloations for otherwise idential rms. In the presene of swithing osts
this is a normal ompetitive outome, whih need not be a red ag for the
9
qB
qA
yA
yB
z
x + S
(17) (13)
(18)
(19)
ν
φ
qB(.)
QB(.)
qA(.)
QA(.)
A
B
C
Figure 1: Equilibria
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antitrust authority. This is relevant, partiularly beause we often observe
persistent asymmetries in market shares in reality and this seems to often
be a great onern for a regulator or a ompetition authority.
Further, even if a rm has larger sales (larger ustomers base) initially,
this may not be true in equilibrium. In our model often it is the initially
smaller rm, whih is more aggressive, that has higher equilibrium sales.
Taking this result to reality, we should not be surprised if suh industries
are exhibiting oasional volatile hanges in leadership. Moreover, the re-
sult should serve as a warning for the regulator from hastily aepting a
paternalisti attitude towards the small rms in industries haraterized by
swithing osts.
3 Comparative statis
It is lear that the onventional Cournot duopoly is a limiting ase in our
model when swithing osts tend to zero. The grey area of ination on the
Figure is growing larger with inrease of osts s. This is very intuitive: none
of the rms wants to adjust its position if the adjustment is ostly. Notie
that for very high osts there is no initial position that makes rms inrease
their sells even from zero - in suh ase entry is suessfully bloked.
The size of the market a obviously has the opposite eet on the region
where the rms do not hange their positions in equilibrium. The slope
of demand funtion b matters for this region in so far as it enters x and
S, higher slope thus leading to smaller set of ination. This also seems
intuitive, as more elasti demand is more attrative for prie uts holding
osts of swithing onstant.
Note also that the upper-right border of the grey region have the slope
−1
2
and −2 regardless of the parameters of the model. Size of the market,
elastiity of demand, prodution and swithing osts all hange position and
size of the area of ination, but do not hange its form. This feature is a
result of our assumption that the two rms are idential apart from initial
positions.
The size of the region with multiple equilibria depends on how large is
φ− ν. It an be shown that this dierene is inreasing in S and dereasing
in x. Hene, the eet of swithing osts and other parameters on this region
is similar to that on grey region.
4 Entry
Given that we have solved for all the initial alloations of onsumers, we an
use the results to examine entry into an industry haraterized by swithing
osts. The entrant that does not fae any sunk osts is equivalent to an
inumbent whih has no initial sales. Thus, Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to
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haraterize the resulting equilibrium for any stritly positive initial sales of
the inumbent, rm A. Namely, equations (11), (13), (14), (17) ontain all
the relevant information for entry analysis.
We start the disussion with monopolisti initial sales of the inumbent.
We shall onsider as monopolisti the points at zero prodution of the rm
B between lower best response of rm A and most asymmetri equilibrium
quantity of rm A, qmA ∈
[
3
2
(x− S), x + S]. In suh ase the entry will
involve the entrant setting the quantity equal to
3
2
(x − S) − 1
2
qmA , whih is
the best response to monopolisti quantity qmA . This an also be seen in
equation (13). The inumbent will not hange its sales from the initial ones.
The market share of the inumbent in the new equilibrium will be, under
the assumptions we made above, somewhat higher than that of the entrant.
The dierene depends on how steep the best response is.
When we onsider the initial sales of the inumbent below monopolisti,
the entrant's equilibrium sales are higher. This is aording to the same
best response dened in (13). When the inumbent's initial sales are below
x−S, the entrant's equilibrium market share is atually higher than that of
the inumbent.
However, if we onsider very small initial sales of the inumbent (qA ≤
yA), the industry will exhibit symmetri sales (x−S, x−S). This orresponds
to equation (11) of Proposition 1. As a qualiation, there is also a small
interval qA ∈ [ν, φ] that results in two equilibria: symmetri (x − S, x − S)
and asymmetri
(
qA,
3
2
(x− S)− 1
2
qA
)
. This an be seen from equation (17)
of proposition 2.
For larger than monopolisti initial sales of the inumbent, qA > x + S,
its equilibrium sales derease. Despite this, the asymmetry in this ase is
maximal: the equilibrium is (x + S, x− 2S), as an be seen from equation
(14).
5 Dynamis
Our results an be applied to get some insights into the adjustment of market
struture to demand shoks. Initial sales in our model an be interpreted as
the equilibrium sales in the previous period haraterized by initial demand.
Suppose now between the periods a demand shok (symmetri or asymmet-
ri) is realized, suh that the new demand is as in our model. In this manner
low initial sales alloations (those lose to the origin in Figure 1) orrespond
to a positive shok in demand and the initial alloations with high sales or-
respond to negative demand shoks. Thus we an hoose any initial state
and analyze the adjustment to shoks.
Similarly, evolving industries and growing markets exhibit large potential
size, and this orresponds in the model to initial alloations at low sales
lose to the origin of the graph (inreasing the onstant term in the demand
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funtion would have exatly suh an eet). On the other hand, in the model
shrinking markets would exhibit small potential size and aordingly initial
alloations further from the origin.
With this interpretation we an explore the impliations of the model
for industry dynamis. As shown in Proposition 1, relatively low initial
sales and signiant asymmetries in these give rise, in equilibrium, to large
hanges in sales by at least one of the sellers. Thus, it follows from the
model that we should not be surprised to observe sudden shifts in the sales
leadership in growing markets or after positive demand shoks. On the
other hand, suh reversals would be less likely for industries where sellers
are operating in stagnating markets. The set of equilibria haraterized
by the proposition above also imply that these are the situations in whih
persistent asymmetries in market shares are more likely.
In the markets with small potential size our model predits that large
initial asymmetries will derease in equilibrium through the smaller rm
inreasing its sales faster than the bigger one. One a rm loks in suiently
high a ustomers base the inentives for further expansion are low and the
model predits onvergene to stable market shares. Note that the model
does not predit that small asymmetries will derease in suh markets.
When the initial sales alloations are rather symmetri and shoks to the
demand are small, the model implies that neither of the rms will be hanging
the level of sales in equilibrium. In this region the inentives of sellers to
inrease market share are weak. These initial alloations an be interpreted
as historial ustomer bases for mature markets along the same lines as
before. Thus in industries (markets) whih are growing at slower rates the
model predits more stable symmetri or asymmetri market shares.
There are at least two testable hypotheses that ome out of our analy-
sis. Firstly, we are more likely to nd alternating leadership in the growing
industries with swithing osts. Seondly, we should see stabilized market
shares (symmetri or asymmetri) in mature industries.
We look at the data on the dynamis of market shares in teleommuni-
ations industry, where swithing osts are substantial. In German mobile
teleom
2
, the market shares of two leading providers remained stable dur-
ing 2000-07. They ranged 36.7% - 41.6% for T-Mobile and 34.7% - 40.0%
for Vodafone. In terms of our model, initially symmetri distribution of the
market shares remains stable.
In Austria 2000-06
3
the market shares of two leading operators (Mo-
bilkom and T-Mobile) were onsistently delining from joint 88.4% to joint
63.9%. Correspondingly, the share of other operators has grown from 11.6%
to 36.1%, onsistently with our model featuring large initial asymmetries
that are redued over time. The same is true for the Netherlands over 1999
2
available at http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/
3
available at http://www.rtr.at/de/tk/Marktinfos
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- 2003, Norway 1993- 2006 [2℄, the UK 2001 - 05 [1℄. A similar story an
be told about Italy
4
, where TIM had the whole market in 1995, and by
2003 TIM, Vodafone and Wind had respetively 45%, 35% and 15% of the
market.
Certainly, these patterns an not serve as a solid evidene in favor of our
model results. A omprehensive eonometri model is needed to disentangle
the eets of swithing osts and multiple other fators that aet ompeti-
tion. However, the features observed in the data are indiative of relevane
of our onlusions.
6 Extension to multiple periods
In this setion we extent our model to multiple (in fat, innitely many)
periods to see if it is robust to suh a modiation. In general formulation,
the optimization problem of the rm A in an innitely repeated Cournot
game with swithing osts is
V (qA, qB) = max
q′
A
{
pi
(
q′A, q
′
B‖qA, qB
)
+ δV
(
q′A, q
′
B
)}
,
s.t.
p = P
(
q′A + q
′
B
)− s if q′A > qA
p = P
(
q′A + q
′
B
)
if q′A ≤ qA
Now our andidate equilibrium is to move to a pair of output (q∗A, q
∗
B)in
the rst period. Suppose we start with initial vetor q0 ≪ q∗. We onsider a
unilateral deviation of rst moving to some quantity qi‖q0i < qi < q∗i . Then
the orresponding values are
V ∗ =
P (q∗A + q
∗
B) q
∗
A
1− δ − sq
∗
A
and
V dev = P (qA + q
∗
B) qA +
δP (q∗A + q
∗
B) q
∗
A
1− δ − s (qA + δq
∗
A) .
The rm A will prefer not to deviate (and hene hange prodution only
one), if
V ∗ − V dev = P (q∗A + q∗B) q∗A − P (qA + q∗B) qA + s (qA + (δ − 1) q∗A) ≥ 0.
Intuitively, the inverse demand should not reat too drastially to the redu-
tion of quantity. In ase of linear demand we have
(q∗A − qA) (a− b (qA + q∗A + q∗B)) + s (qA + (δ − 1) q∗A) ≥ 0.
4
available at http://www.group.abnamro.om/index.fm
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Clearly, the rst term is most likely to be negative, if qA → q∗A , in whih
ase we have a− b (2q∗A + q∗B).
But this is just our demand funtion, the supremum of the argument is
3 times Cournot quantity, so the innum of the funtion is exatly zero.
Thus, the rst term is always positive. The seond term is positive, if
qA > (1− δ) q∗A. Note though that at in the opposite ase (small quanti-
ties) the rst term beomes large: (δq∗A) (a− b ((2− δ) q∗A + q∗B)). Taken at
the extreme, we have q∗A (a− b (q∗A + q∗B)) + s ((δ − 1) q∗A) ≥ 0 meaning that
fritionless Cournot prot should exeed swithing osts, whih is obviously
satised if the market is to exhibit any hanges in quantities at all.
In eet, with linear demand our andidate equilibrium brings larger
value than deviation
5
.
The fat that there exists a Markov perfet Nash equilibrium where the
rms only move one allows us to ompute the regions of initial alloations
for whih a rm will not hange its output in the same fashion as for the one-
shot game. In fat, the shape of these regions turns out to be very similar,
exept that the set is smaller, but not empty for δ > 0. For δ = 1 obviously
this set is empty and the only Markov perfet equilibrium is the Cournot
equilibrium of the fritionless game.
For any 0 < δ < 1 we an thus perform an analysis similar to the one-shot
game above to nd both symmetri and asymmetri equilibria, analogously
as in the one-shot game.
Thus the qualitative results of the model persist when we extend the
number of periods (even when we onsider innitely many periods with the
disount fator below 1) and restrit ourselves to the simplest equilibrium
onept onsistent with rational behavior in an innitely repeated game set-
ting.
7 Disussion of the results
Our simple Cournot model shows that in the presene of swithing osts equi-
librium alloation depends on the initial alloation. The initial alloation in
this model an be interpreted as the rms' market shares relative to potential
demand. Thus, initial alloations lose to the origin of the graph orrespond
to situations where the market has signiant potential for growth, and the
alloations where both rms have large initial sales orresponds to a situa-
tion in whih market is shrinking. In this view a sudden shok, say inrease
in expeted market size, ould indue a hange in relative market shares if
it is large enough. This response ould lead to a reversal in the order of
market share sizes. One impliation of the model is that the adjustment to
shoks in demand is hard to predit and may involve sudden shifts in market
5
It is standard to show that the same is true for a deviation in any other period and
for deviations in multiple periods.
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positions of the rms. Industries exhibiting persistent asymmetries in mar-
ket shares, periods of relatively stable division of market followed by sudden
readjustments or longer periods of symmetri market division would all be
onsistent with the presene of swithing osts and imperfet dierentiation
between old and new ustomers, as in our model.
Entry deision an also be analyzed in our model. In new industries with
a large growth potential the model would predit a relatively symmetri
market shares after the entry, as the entrant holds large sales upon entry
and the inumbent does not ght aggressively for a market share. At the
other extreme an entry to a shrinking monopolized market would result in a
relatively asymmetri market alloation, despite the fat that the inumbent
is even less aggressive in suh a ase.
Reently a theory of the stepping stones, or the ladder of investment
theory, has beome prominent in the literature and among regulators of
some industries (teleommuniation) where the ost of initial investment
into infrastruture are high. The idea of the ladder of investment is that an
entrant be given aess to the infrastruture of the inumbent so he an build
a ustomer base, whih would then justify investment in own infrastruture.
If the aess to infrastruture is limited so that initially the entrant an not
supply the whole market the model predits that it ould easily happen that
after the entrant has aptured a signiant ustomers base it may lose the
inentive to inrease sales further and with it the inentive to invest in own
infrastruture, thus defeating the purpose of the ladder idea. The entrant
would invest in large infrastruture apaity in the absene of the ladder,
but after apturing a signiant ustomer base it may no longer be optimal
for it to build his own infrastruture.
8 Conlusion
Our analysis in this paper is entered around one basi feature of reality:
history dependene. In our simple Cournot setup history matters beause
the ustomers have to inur swithing osts whenever they buy from a new
seller. We are able to haraterize equilibrium of Cournot game for any initial
alloation of sales. Our main nding is persisting asymmetry in market
shares of otherwise idential rms. This result survives extending the model
to multiple periods, inluding an innitely repeated game.
We also show that when initial asymmetries are small, they tend to re-
main small, as none of the rms is motivated to behave aggressively. When
initial asymmetries are large, the smaller rm has an inentive to expand,
and sometimes it does so to the extent that it takes more than half of the
market. This gives us empirially testable hypotheses of stable market shares
in the markets with uniform distribution of market shares and high volatility
in the markets with very uneven distribution of market shares.
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Our model also provides rationale for a large-sale one-time entry versus
gradual buildup of apaities. The intuition remains intat: with swithing
osts a fresh entrant is the one who has nothing to lose and is relatively
more aggressive than a seller with an established ustomer base.
Linear demand and homogenous good framework are the main limita-
tions of our model. However, dierent demand funtions do not hange the
nature of ompetition, so we do not expet our qualitative results to be al-
tered signiantly. Heterogenous goods framework would be an interesting
extension to our analysis, adding new hannels for swithing osts to work
through. At the same time, the main eets of ustomer lok-in outlined
here will remain on its plae.
The analysis presented is general and an be applied to any industries
haraterized by swithing osts. Teleommuniations, banking, airlines are
among lassial examples of suh industries.
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